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RECONCEIVING THE NINTH AMENDMENT
Randy E. Barnettt
It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is in-
tended to be without effect; and, therefore, such a construction is
inadmissible, unless the words require it.'
I do not think you can use the Ninth Amendment unless you know
something of what it means. For example, if you had an amend-
ment that says "Congress shall make no" and then there is an ink-
blot, and you cannot read the rest of it, and that is the only copy
you have, I do not think the court can make up what might be
under the inkblot. 2
I
CLEARING A PATH FOR THE NINTH AMENDMENT
The courts long have protected constitutional rights that are
not listed explicitly in the Constitution,3 but are they warranted in
doing so? As scholars and commentators vigorously debate this and
other questions about the appropriate role ofjudges in interpreting
the Constitution, the Ninth Amendment has assumed increasing im-
portance. Its declaration that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitu-
tion, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people"4 has suggested to many that the set
of rights protected by the Constitution is not dosed and that judges
may be authorized to protect these "unenumerated" rights on
occasion.
While much is controversial about the Ninth Amendment, the
events that led to its adoption generally are agreed upon.5 The
t Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law,
Visiting Scholar, Northwestern University School of Law. Visiting Scholar, Northwest-
ern University School of Law. B.A. Northwestern Universit), 1974; J.D. Harvard Law
School, 1977. I wish to thank Sotirios Barber, Erwin Chemerinsky, Linda Hirshman,
Gordon Hylton, Sandy Levinson, David Mayer, Roger Pilon, Sheldon Richman, Carol
Rose, and Chris Wonnell for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts. A revised
version of this article will appear as the introduction to THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE
PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (R. Barnett, ed. forth-
coming). Financial support was received from the Marshall D. Ewell Research Fund of
the I.I.T. Chicago-Kent College of Law.
I Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 174 (180$).
2 Testimony of Robert Bork, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1987, at 22, col. 1.
3 For a list of judicially protected unenumerated riglts see infra note 106.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
5 For discussions of the legislative history of the Ninth Amendment, see M. GooD-
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Ninth Amendment was originally conceived by James Madison. A
committee of the House of Representatives, on which Madison
served, revised it. The House and the Senate debated and approved
it and, along with the rest of the Bill of Rights, the several states
ratified it. Any provision that survives this process must be pre-
sumed by interpreters of the Constitution to have some legitimate
constitutional function, whether actual or only potential. Despite
this long respected presumption, the Supreme Court has generally
interpreted the Ninth Amendment in a manner that denies it any
role in the constitutional structure.6 The Ninth Amendment's most
important appearance in a Supreme Court case to date has been in a
supporting role.7 In his now-famous concurring opinion in Griswold
v. Connecticut,8 Justice Goldberg stated: "In interpreting the Consti-
tution, 'real effect should be given to all the words it uses,'.. .. The
Ninth Amendment to the Constitution may be regarded by some as
a recent discovery .... but since 1791 it has been a basic part of the
Constitution which we are sworn to uphold."9
In this article, I hope to clear a path for a more fruitful and
faithful interpretation of the Ninth Amendment by removing certain
doctrinal and theoretical impediments to such an interpretation.
This requires a critical appraisal of what I call the "rights-powers"
conception of constitutional rights-a conception that the Court has
applied exclusively to the Ninth Amendment, rendering it function-
less. I shall then contrast this view with the very different "power-
constraint" conception that the Court has used to interpret most
other constitutional rights. If I accomplish nothing else in this arti-
MAN, THE NINTH AMENDMENT 4-8 (1981); B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMEND-
MENT 6-18 (1955); Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3-9 (1980);
Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REV. 223, 228-59
(1983); Dunbar, James Madison and the Ninth Amendment, 42 VA. L. REV. 627, 629-40
(1956); Massey, Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth Amendment, 38 HASTINGS L.J.
305, 307-11 (1987); Rogge, Unenumerated Rights, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 787, 787-93 (1959);
Van Loan, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment, 48 B.U.L. REV. 1, 4-17 (1968); Note,
The Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 814, 815-20 (1966)
(authored by James F. Kelly).
6 The singular exception to this is Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555 (1980). There, the plurality based its opinion, in part, on the Ninth Amend-
ment. Id. at 579 n.15.
7 The judicial use of the Ninth Amendment is summarized in Redlich, The Ninth
Amendment, in 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTrrunON 1316-20 (L. Levy
ed. 1982).
8 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
9 Id. at 491 (Goldberg, J. concurring) (citation omitted). Justice Goldberg relied
on three scholarly works on the Ninth Amendment: B. PATTERSON, supra note 5; Kelsey,
The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 IND. LJ. 309 (1936); Redlich, Are There
"Certain Rights... Retained by the People?", 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 787 (1962). Except for
references in treatises on the Constitution, until Griswold these three were virtually the
only treatments exclusively devoted to the Ninth Amendment.
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cle, I intend to show that the traditional rights-powers interpreta-
tion of the Ninth Amendment is untenable.
The rights-powers conception is, however, more a symptom
than the real cause of the Ninth Amendment's past and current ne-
glect. The principal obstacles in the path of a functional Ninth
Amendment are certain views of constitutional structure and a deep-
seated fear of letting judges base their decisions on unenumerated
rights-a fear that stems in large part from a modem philosophical
skepticism about rights. In this article, after laying the rights-pow-
ers conception to rest, I shall present the outlines of a power-con-
straint conception of the Ninth Amendment. In doing so, I shall
discuss how the judicial protection of unenumerated rights is consis-
tent with the structural features of the Constitution and why philo-
sophical skepticism about the idea of "retained" rights should not
operate as a bar to their recognition. Finally, I shall suggest a prac-
tical method of interpreting the rights retained by the people re-
ferred to in the Ninth Amendment.
My analysis will rely heavily on the explanation of constitutional
rights provided by James Madison in his speech before the House of
Representatives.' 0 I do this for two reasons. First, such a focus
responds to the concern of some that giving the Ninth Amendment
a genuine role to play in constitutional adjudication somehow con-
flicts with the intent of the framers. As the Framer who first con-
ceived of the Ninth Amendment, Madison's conception of
constitutional rights is the most pertinent to an understanding of
the Ninth Amendment's intended function. Whether or not the
views Madison expressed to the House reflected a clear consensus
of his contemporaries, if a robust theory of the unenumerated rights
retained by the people is consistent with his vision, then it will be
quite difficult to sustain an objection to such a theory on the ground
that it violates original intent.
Second, I have great respect for Madison as a political theorist.
For this reason, in deciding upon the best theory of the Ninth
Amendment, I think it is useful to consult the opinion of the in-
sightful person who conceived it and who also conceived a good
deal of the Constitution's other important features. I view the
Framers as teachers, not wardens, and consider their writings to be
the best place to begin looking for a theoretical understanding of
the text they wrote.
The theoretical issues raised by the Ninth Amendment are, in
my view, extremely fundamental and this article is in no way in-
10 See 1 THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
454 U. Gales & W. Seaton eds. 1834) (Speech of Rep. J. Madison) [hereinafter
"Madison"].
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tended to be the last word on the subject.11 A complete defense of
allowing the Ninth Amendment a real constitutional function would
require a much more extensive presentation than I shall attempt
here. Indeed, a complete analysis of the rights "retained by the
people" would require nothing short of a comprehensive theory of
the Constitution.
II
Two COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
A. The Rights-Powers Conception of Constitutional Rights
Although the longstanding neglect of the Ninth Amendment is
a product of basic concerns about grounding judicial review on
unenumerated rights, this neglect would not have been possible
without an interpretation that purports to give the amendment a
meaning while denying it any functional role in constitutional dis-
putes. Such an interpretation employs a rights-powers conception
of constitutional rights, a view that can be traced to a Federalist ar-
gument against the addition of any bill of rights. Federalists origi-
nally argued that a bill of rights was unnecessary because the
Constitution granted the national government only enumerated
powers. Any power that was not enumerated could not be exercised
by the national government. A bill of rights, they argued, would be
redundant and therefore unnecessary. Any rights enumerated in a
bill of rights would be outside the powers of the national govern-
ment and would need no further protection. As Alexander Hamil-
ton wrote, "why declare that things shall not be done which there is
no power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty
of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by
which restrictions may be imposed?"' 2 James Wilson made the
same argument:
[E]very thing which is not given, is reserved.... [I]t would have
been superfluous and absurd, to have stipulated with a federal
body of our own creation, that we should enjoy those privileges,
of which we are not divested either by the intention or the act that
11 I discuss the relationship between the judicial protection of unenumerated rights
and the ability of a constitution to impart legitimacy on enacted legislation in Barnett,
Foreword: The Ninth Amendment and Constitutional Legitimacy, 64 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 37
(1988). For a representative collection of writings on the Ninth Amendment and a bibli-
ography of additional Ninth Amendment scholarship, see THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE
PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (R. Barnett ed. forth-
coming). For a recent collection of Ninth Amendment scholarship that appeared while
this article was in production, see Symposium on Interpreting the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 37 (1988).
12 THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 559 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
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has brought that body into existence.13
In United Public Workers v. Mitchell,14 Justice Reed used this
rights-powers conception of constitutional rights to interpret the
Ninth Amendment. Writing for the Court, he stated:
The powers granted by the Constitution to the Federal Govern-
ment are subtracted from the totality of sovereignty originally in
the states and the people. Therefore, when objection is made that
the exercise of a federal power infringes upon rights reserved by
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the inquiry must be directed
toward the granted power under which the action of the Union
was taken. If granted power is found, necessarily the objection of
invasion of those rights, reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments, must fail. 15
The rights-powers conception of the Ninth Amendment views
delegated powers and constitutional rights as logically complemen-
tary. This approach has two important advantages. First, when
rights are viewed as the logical obverse of powers, content can be
given to unenumerated rights by exclusively focusing on the ex-
pressed provisions delegating powers. By avoiding the need to di-
rectly address the substance of unenumerated rights, the rights-
powers conception appears to provide judges a practical way of in-
terpreting the otherwise open-ended Ninth Amendment. Second,
the view that rights and powers are logically complementary seems
to avoid any internal conflict or logical contradiction between con-
stitutional rights and powers. In this way, the rights-powers concep-
tion has the apparent virtue of treating the Constitution as internally
coherent. For these reasons, the rights-powers conception contin-
ues to attract proponents.' 6 Nonetheless, it is a dubious interpreta-
tion of the Ninth Amendment for at least three reasons.
13 Address by James Wilson to a Meeting of the Citizens of Philadelphia (1787),
reprinted in B. SCHWARTZ, I THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 529 (1971).
Both Hamilton and Wilson argued that an expressed protection of freedom of the press
was unnecessary since the regulation of the press was beyond the powers of Congress.
In the Federal Convention, Roger Sherman used the same example:
Mr. Pinkney & Mr. Gerry, moved to insert a declaration "that the
liberty of the Press should be inviolably observed--"
Mr. Sherman-It is unnecessary-The power of Congress does not
extend to the Press.
Federal Convention (Sept. 14, 1787), reprinted in B. SCHWARTZ, supra, at 437, 439.
14 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
15 Id. at 95-96. Calvin Massey reports that this case was one of only "seven
Supreme Court cases prior to Griswold [that] dealt in any fashion with the ninth amend-
ment .. " Massey, supra note 5, at 305 n.1.
16 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 5, at 3 (Ninth Amendment rights and Tenth Amend-
ment powers "are two sides of the same coin."); Cooper, Limited Government and Individ-
ual Liberty: The Ninth Amendment's Forgotten Lessons, 4J. LAw & POL. 63, 78 (1987) ("A ninth
amendment claim againstfederal action ... is determined by the extent of the federal
government's enumerated powers ... ").
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First, this interpretation erroneously construes the Ninth
Amendment to mean nothing more than what is stated in the Tenth.
The Tenth Amendment reads: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people."' 7 The
idea that animates the rights-powers conception-that powers not
delegated are reserved-is expressed clearly here. There was abso-
lutely no need for another amendment, confusingly written in terms
of "rights" that are "retained by the people," to express exactly the
same idea. 18 Justice Reed's reference to "those rights, reserved by the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments .. ."19 illustrates the confusion the
rights-powers conception can cause. The Tenth Amendment does
not speak of rights, of course, but of reserved "powers." By contrast,
the Ninth Amendment speaks only of rights, not of powers. Yet
Charles Cooper states that: "The ninth amendment does not spec-
ify what rights it protects other than by its reference to the enumer-
ated powers of the federal government." 20
The second objection to the rights-powers conception follows
from the first: This conception renders the Ninth Amendment ef-
fectively inapplicable to any conceivable case or controversy. On
the assumption that rights and powers are logically complementary,
rights begin at precisely the point where powers end. Thus, in prin-
ciple, at least, there can never be a conflict between a right and a
power. But because the focus of the rights-powers approach is
entirely on the powers side, any claim that the national government
had exceeded its enumerated powers would rely entirely upon the
provisions enumerating the powers of the national government (to
show the absence of a power) and the language of the Tenth
Amendment (to show that those powers not delegated are re-
served). The Ninth Amendment has absolutely no role to play in
the analysis.
The problem is not that there would never be occasion to use
17 U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment explicitly incorporates the enu-
merated powers theory of the national government. Although it is often thought of as a
"states' rights" provision, the Tenth Amendment is entirely neutral as to which powers
are "reserved to the states" and which "to the people," and, therefore, it does not ex-
plicitly endorse any particular vision of state governments.
18 See, e.g., Kelsey, supra note 9, at 310 ("there was some distinction in the minds of
the framers . . . between declarations of right and limitations on or prohibitions of power...
[otherwise] the Ninth Amendment would have been unnecessary."); Note, supra note 5,
at 832 ("Such a reading of the ninth amendment is clearly wrong; it is the tenth amend-
ment that protects state powers against federal encroachment and that limits the federal
government to the exercise of express and implied powers."). Cf J. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISrUST 34-35 (1980) ("The Tenth Amendment... completely fulfills the function
that is here being proffered as all the Ninth Amendment was about.").
19 United Pub. Workers, at 96 (emphasis added).
20 Cooper, supra note 16, at 79-80 (emphasis added).
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the Ninth Amendment. After all, there has been no occasion to
enforce the rule requiring the President to be at least thirty-five
years old either. Rather, the problem is that a rights-powers con-
ception deprives the Ninth Amendment of any potential application.
It does not allow for even a hypothetical case that would require an
independent Ninth Amendment analysis. Moreover, the rights-
powers conception does not simply render the Ninth Amendment
unenforceable by the judiciary. The Ninth Amendment is rendered
irrelevant to any conceivable constitutional decision, regardless of
which branch of government is the decision maker.
Of course, it is possible that the Congress approved and the
states ratified an amendment that was meant to be inapplicable to
any conceivable circumstance. However, we cannot prefer such an
interpretation of a constitutional enactment if one that contemplates
a potential role is also available. 21 Such an alternative interpreta-
tion, based on a power-constraint conception of constitutional
rights, will be suggested below.22 In sum, absent compelling evi-
dence, we cannot presume any provision of the Constitution to be as
superfluous as the rights-powers conception would render the Ninth
Amendment.
The third objection to the rights-powers conception is that it
cannot be limited to the Ninth Amendment. If it is correct, it must
apply to the rights enumerated in the Constitution in the same man-
ner as it does to the unenumerated rights referred to in the Ninth
Amendment. Assuming that the rights of the people are the logical
converse of the powers delegated to the government, the very
enumeration of a particular power in the Constitution automatically
ceded to the general government any potentially conflicting rights
that might have existed prior to the adoption of the Constitution. If
this conception is correct, however, then even an enumerated right
should never constrain an enumerated power. In the words of
Raoul Berger: "Thus viewed, the Bill of Rights added nothing, but
was merely declaratory. ' 23 Of course, as noted below, this is not at
all how courts have interpreted enumerated constitutional rights.24
Legislative acts that fall within an enumerated power can violate an
enumerated right.25
It is not surprising that a rights-powers conception denying the
21 Cf. Massey, supra note 5, at 316. ("Construing the ninth amendment as a mere
declaration of a constitutional truism, devoid of enforceable content, renders its sub-
stance nugatory and assigns to its framers an intention to engage in a purely moot exer-
cise."). See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 39-87 and accompanying text.
23 Berger, supra note 5, at 6 (footnote omitted).
24 See infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
25 See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (congressional act
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effect of unenumerated rights denies effect to enumerated rights as
well. For the Federalists originally launched the rights-powers
conception against the enumeration of any constitutional rights to
defuse Antifederalist opposition to the Constitution. James
Madison would have had no reason to devise a means of protecting
unenumerated rights placed in jeopardy by an enumeration that, at
that time, he still opposed. The problem that the Ninth Amend-
ment was devised to solve simply had yet to arise.
The rights-powers conception reflects a losing argument
against enumerating any constitutional rights. Notwithstanding the
ultimate victory of the Federalists at the Constitutional Convention,
their attempt to defend the absence of a bill of rights on the grounds
that it would be redundant was controversial when made26 and ulti-
mately was rejected during the ratification process. No one denies
that ratification of the Constitution depended upon the promise of a
forthcoming bill of rights. It is odd indeed to insist that the best
interpretation of the Bill of Rights is based on the theory used by its
most vociferous opponents.
The rights-powers conception of constitutional rights is attrac-
tive both because it promises a practical way of interpreting
unenumerated rights and because it appears to interpret the rights
and powers provisions of the text in a logically consistent manner.
Unfortunately, it achieves these objectives at the price of rendering
the Ninth Amendment completely functionless and superfluous.
Still, any alternative account of constitutional rights that contem-
plates unenumerated rights doing any serious work in constitutional
analysis must show both the practicality of its method and the inter-
nal coherence of such a constitutional scheme.
In the balance of this article, I shall describe and defend an-
other way to conceive of constitutional rights, including those rights
retained by the people: the power-constraint conception. In Part
regulating the receipt of "communist political propaganda" is violative of the first
amendment and is unconstitutional).
26 Thomas Jefferson, for example, rejected Wilson's argument that a bill of rights
was unnecessary. In a letter to Madison, he wrote:
To say, as Mr. Wilson does that a bill of rights was not necessary because
all is reserved in the case of the general government which is not given,
while in the particular ones all is given which is not reserved might do for
the Audience to whom it was addressed, but is surely gratis dictum, op-
posed by strong inferences from the body of the instrument, as well as
from the omission of the clause of our present confederation which had
declared that in express terms.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), reprinted in 1 B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 606-07. Even Madison, who at one point accepted Wilson's
argument that a declaration of rights was unnecessary, did not do so "in the extent
argued by Mr. Wilson .... " Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17,
1788), reprinted in I B. SCHWARTZ, supra, at 615.
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IV, I shall examine the practicality of three methods of interpreting
these power-constraining unenumerated rights. In the next two sec-
tions, I shall explain why conceiving constitutional rights as con-
straining the exercise of delegated powers is not a contradictory
approach to rights and powers. Instead of viewing rights and pow-
ers as logically complementary, a power-constraint conception views
rights and powers as functionally complementary. Moreover, this ap-
proach is truer than the rights-powers conception to the concerns
expressed by some Federalists about the dangers of enumerating
any rights.
B. Recasting The Original Debate Over Constitutional Rights
The idea that constitutional rights are simply what is left over
after the people have delegated powers to the government flies in
the face of the amendments themselves. For example, it is impossi-
ble to find a "right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury," 27 a right against double jeopardy or self-incrimination, 28 or a
right to be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures" 29 by
closely examining the limits of the enumerated powers of the na-
tional government. The pivotal mistake of Justice Reed and those
commentators who would neuter the Ninth Amendment is their ex-
clusive concentration on only one of two Federalist arguments.
Consequently, they fail to discern the distinct functions played by
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.30
The Federalists' argument that the enumeration of powers ren-
dered a declaration of rights unnecessary is best viewed as a re-
sponse to the criticism made by opponents of ratification that the
Constitution was dangerous because it lacked a bill of rights. This
response employed the theory that the federal government is one of
limited and enumerated powers, a theory that eventually was incor-
porated in the Tenth Amendment. However, the Federalists not
only responded to this criticism of the proposed Constitution, they
also advanced a criticism of their own against the idea of a bill of
rights. They attempted to turn the tables on the Federalists by argu-
ing that a declaration of rights would be dangerous. In Hamilton's
words: "I . . .affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the
extent in which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in
the proposed Constitution, but would even be dangerous." 3'
27 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
28 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
29 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
30 1 thank David Mayer for emphasizing to me the importance of this separate strain
of the Federalist argument for distinguishing the rationales of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments.
31 THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton), supra note 12, at 559.
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Enumerating rights in the Constitution was seen as presenting
two potential sources of danger. The first was that such an enumer-
ation could be used to justify an unwarranted expansion of federal
powers. As Hamilton explained: "They would contain various ex-
ceptions to powers which are not granted; and on this very account,
would afford a colourable pretext to claim more than were
granted."3 2 The second source of danger was that any right ex-
cluded from an enumeration would bejeopardized. In his speech to
the House explaining his proposed amendments, James Madison
stressed this danger of enumerated rights:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumer-
ating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would dispar-
age those rights which were not placed in that enumeration; and it
might follow by implication, that those rights which were not sin-
gled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the Gen-
eral Government, and were consequently insecure. This is one of
the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the
admission of a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it
may be guarded against.33
Madison's initial device for doing so was a provision that ran to-
gether both of these concerns:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in
favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish
the just importance of other rights retained by the people, or as to
enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution; but either as
actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater
caution. 34
Eventually the two ideas were unpacked. The danger of interpret-
ing federal powers too expansively was handled by the Tenth
Amendment, while the danger ofjeopardizing unenumerated rights
was addressed by the Ninth Amendment.
Thus, the Federalist position does not disparage as superfluous
the rights retained by the people. Nor does it deny that retained
rights operate as a genuine and enforceable constraint on govern-
ment. On the contrary, the Federalists disparaged the idea of using
a written declaration of rights in the Constitution precisely to pro-
tect the rights retained by the people. They expressed fear that an
incomplete or inaccurate written declaration may well undermine
the status of the unwritten retained rights. In sum, this Federalist
objection to a bill of rights assumes the preeminent importance of
32 Id.
33 Madison, supra note 10, at 456.
34 Id. at 452.
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the unwritten rights retained by the people.35
There is no reason to suppose that these Federalists did not
share the then-prevailing beliefs in rights antecedent to govern-
ment.3 6 For example, the same James Wilson who used a rights-
powers argument in his vocal opposition to a bill of rights was an
ardent adherent to natural rights. In his lectures on jurisprudence
he explicitly rejects the views of both Edmund Burke and William
Blackstone and contends that: "Government, in my humble opin-
ion, should be formed to secure and to enlarge the exercise of the
natural rights of its members; and every government, which has not
this in view, as its principal object, is not a government of the legiti-
mate kind."37 Nor were these mere "theoretical" or "philosophi-
cal" rights with no real bite:
I go farther; and now proceed to show, that in peculiar instances,
in which those rights can receive neither protection nor repara-
tion from civil government, they are, notwithstanding its institu-
tion, entitled still to that defence, and to those methods of
recovery, which are justified and demanded in a state of nature.
The defence of one's self, justly called the primary law of na-
ture, is not, nor can it be abrogated by any regulation of municipal
law.38
C. The "Power-Constraint" Conception of Constitutional
Rights
A rights-powers conception of constitutional rights is untenable
if a better account of constitutional rights is available. In fact, courts
do not use a rights-powers conception to interpret enumerated or
written constitutional rights. Enumerated rights need not be the
logical mirror image of enumerated powers. Rather, enumerated
rights can potentially limit in some manner the exercise of powers
35 Of course, some Federalists may have been motivated less by concerns about the
efficacy and dangers of a bill of rights than by a concern that the absence of a bill of
rights would jeopardize the ratification of the Constitution (which in fact it did until
assurances of future amendments were made). Nonetheless, the analysis presented in
the text assumes that the positions articulated by Hamilton, Wilson, and Madison were
advanced in good faith. A contrary, more cynical, assumption can hardly be offered to
bolster the case for a Federalist-style rights-powers conception.
36 These prevailing beliefs are discussed in Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of
American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 369 (1928-1929); Grey, Origins of the
Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv.
843 (1978); Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127 (1987).
37 Wilson, Of the Natural Rights of Individuals, in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 307
(J.D. Andrews ed. 1896).
38 Id. at 335. Wilson's lectures, given between 1790 and 1792, also undermine the
claim that by the time of the Constitution, Americans had lost their Lockean and revolu-
tionary ardor for natural rights in favor of a more conservative Blackstonian positivism
that favored legislative supremacy.
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delegated by other provisions of the Constitution. A principal rea-
son for this was voiced by Eldridge Gerry during the House debate
concerning the proposed amendments: "This declaration of rights,
I take it, is intended to secure the people against the maladministra-
tion of the Government; if we could suppose that, in all cases, the
rights of the people would be attended to, the occasion for guards
of this kind would be removed." 39
Constitutional rights can be conceived as "power-constraints"
that regulate the exercise of power by Congress and the executive
branch by constraining either their choice of means or their choice
of ends. First, constitutional rights are means constraints.40
Although the enumeration of powers restricts Congress to pursuing
only certain ends, constitutional rights further restrict the means by
which these ends may be pursued. In this way, in contrast with the
rights-powers conception, the power-constraint conception contem-
plates a potential conflict between constitutional rights and enumer-
ated powers.
Under this conception, it is possible that means chosen to
pursue a constitutionally permissible end might infringe a constitu-
tional right.4 1 Suppose, for example, that in pursuit of its enumer-
ated power to "lay and collect Taxes" or to "raise and support
Armies," Congress infringed on the enumerated rights of free
speech and assembly. If so, Congress would not have violated the
Tenth Amendment for it was acting within its delegated powers, but
may have violated the First Amendment because it exercised its
power in a rights-violating manner.
The Supreme Court appears to have adopted a means-con-
straints approach when enumerated rights are at issue. As the Court
stated in Dennis v. United States:42 "The question with which we are
concerned here is not whether Congress has such a power, but
whether the means which it has employed conflict with the First and
39 1 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 778 (J.
Gales & W. Seaton eds. 1834) (Remarks of Rep. E. Gerry).
40 See, e.g., S. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS 113 (1984) ("Constitu-
tional rights . .. remove certain means from those means available to the government
for pursuing its authorized ends.").
41 One might try to salvage the rights-powers theory by claiming that there can be
no clash between powers and rights because Congress has no power to violate a consti-
tutional right. Although this response maintains a formal distinction, it suggests an en-
tirely different methodology for determining the content of constitutional rights than
that described byJustice Reed in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
This formulation of the rights-powers distinction would require an inquiry into the sub-
stance of constitutional rights to determine the extent of Congressional power. More-
over, this distinction does not provide an objection to including unenumerated rights in
such an inquiry.
42 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. '43 On the floor of Con-
gress, Madison made a very similar argument: "[T]he great object
in view is to limit and qualify the powers of Government, by except-
ing out of the grant of power those cases in which the Government
ought not to act, or to act only in a particular mode." 44 He then offered
a similar example:
The General Government has a right to pass all laws which shall
be necessary to collect its revenue; the means for enforcing the
collection are within the direction of the Legislature: may not gen-
eral warrants be considered necessary for the purpose . .. ? If
there was reason for restraining the State Governments from ex-
ercising this power, there is like reason for restraining the Federal
Government.45
Perhaps, then, John Ely judged Madison a bit too harshly when
he attributed to him and others "a failure to recognize that rights
and powers are not simply the absence of one another but that
rights can cut across or 'trump' powers. '" 46 By the same token,
Raoul Berger's response to Ely that "whether the Founders were
mistaken in logic is of no moment if they acted on that mistaken
view" 47 was premature, for at least one of the Framers was not mis-
taken in this regard.
Moreover, as Madison's example suggests, the Necessary and
Proper clause exacerbates the means-end problem within a scheme
of delegated powers. After enumerating specific powers of Con-
gress, the Constitution authorizes the Congress, "[ito make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof."'48 This open-ended language heightens the pros-
pect that Congress or some department or officer of the general
government may pursue a delegated end by means that infringe
upon the rights of the people. Therefore, some regulation of the
means employed to achieve enumerated governmental ends must
supplement the device of enumerating powers. This is one way that
constitutional rights may functionally complement a scheme of dele-
gated powers.
43 Id. at 501 (emphasis added). See also Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109,
112 (1959) ("Congress ... must exercise its powers subject to the.., relevant limita-
tions of the Bill of Rights.").
44 Madison, supra note 10, at 454 (emphasis added).
45 Id. at 456.
46 J. ELY, supra note 18, at 36. The metaphor of "trump" suggests a power-con-
straint conception.
47 Berger, supra note 5, at 21-22 (citation omitted).
48 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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Even Madison, a strong proponent of the Necessary and Proper
clause, acknowledged that it was susceptible to abuse and conse-
quently that there was a need for constitutional rights to constrain
the means chosen by the general government:
It is true, the powers of the General Government are circum-
scribed, they are directed to particular objects; but even if Gov-
ernment keeps within those limits, it has certain discretionary
powers with respect to the means, which may admit of abuse to a
certain extent, . . . because in the constitution of the United
States, there is a clause granting to Congress the power to make
all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into exe-
cution the powers vested in the Government of the United States,
or in any department or officer thereof. .... 49
The second power-constraining function of constitutional
rights is to limit the permissible ends of governmental activity. Con-
stitutional rights were adopted, in Madison's words, "as actual limi-
tations of such powers, or ... merely for greater caution."50 This last
phrase suggests that, in addition to placing actual or additional lim-
its on the means by which government can accomplish its legitimate
ends, constitutional rights provide a "redundant" or cautionary
safeguard in the event that the acts of government exceed its proper
ends. This function is also reflected in Madison's earlier quoted re-
mark that "the great object in view is to limit and qualify the powers
of Government, by excepting out of the grant of power those cases in
which Government ought not to act, or to act only in a particular
mode." 5 1 In other words, the Bill of Rights was meant to constrain
the powers of government in two ways: by reinforcing the limita-
tions on the delegated powers or ends of government and by plac-
ing additional restrictions on the means by which government may
pursue its delegated ends.
The combination of two different strategies for limiting the
powers of government-constitutional rights and expressed limita-
tions on powers-creates an interesting dynamic. When govern-
ment acts within a narrow construction of its powers, constitutional
rights play only a minor role in constraining its activity. As the enu-
merated powers are given an increasingly expanded interpretation,
however, constitutional rights assume a greater importance within
the constitutional scheme. Even if no logical conflict initially existed
between delegated powers and constitutional rights (whether enu-
merated or not) previously nonexistent conflicts between rights and
powers might well emerge as the scope of governmental powers ex-
49 Madison, supra note 10, at 455.
50 Id. at 452 (emphasis added).
51 Id. at 454 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 74:1
19881 RECONCEIVING THE NINTH AMENDMENT 15
pands. As Justice Brennan has observed, "the possibilities for colli-
sion between government activity and individual rights will increase
as the power and authority of government itself expands." 52
If one concedes that the rights enumerated in the constitution
were intended as "actual limitations of such [delegated] powers,"53
then the rights-powers conception becomes a dubious interpreta-
tion of the Ninth Amendment. For such an interpretation implies
that a fundamentally different conception of constitutional rights
applies to the "retained" rights of the Ninth Amendment than ap-
plies to the enumerated rights. This implication appears to conflict
with Madison's claim that the enumerated rights also included "re-
tained" rights:
In some instances they [the enumerated rights] assert those rights
which are exercised by the people in forming and establishing a
plan of Government. In other instances, they specify those rights
which are retained when particular powers are given up to be exercised by the
Legislature. In other instances they specify positive rights, which
may seem to result from the nature of the compact. 54
The wording of the Ninth Amendment itself argues against such dif-
ferential treatment. For the Ninth Amendment declares that "[t]he
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the people." 55
Supporters of a rights-powers interpretation of the Ninth
Amendment rely heavily on a passage of a letter written by Madison
to George Washington in 187956 in which Madison employs a
rights-powers distinction as part of a defense of the Ninth Amend-
ment:
If a line can be drawn between the powers granted and the rights
retained, it would seem to be the same thing, whether the latter to
be secured by declaring that they shall not be abridged, or that the
52 Brennan, Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1, 9 (1985).
53 Madison, supra note 10, at 452. The quotation is excerpted from the precursor
to the Ninth Amendment which appears in full in the text accompanying note 34.
54 Id. at 454 (emphasis added). Madison's characterization of the enumerated
rights as including, among others, rights that were retained by the people also under-
mines Raoul Berger's claim that ajudicial "power" to protect retained rights would un-
dermine the framer's intent to limit federal power. Berger, supra note 5, at 7. Madison
made clear that the retained rights were not "assigned" to the federal government: to
the contrary, he emphasized that they constitute an area in which the "Government
ought not to act." Id. This means, in my judgment, that the courts have not been em-
powered to enforce the retained rights against either the federal government or the
states. In fact, Madison speaks here of "particular powers ... given up to be exercised by
the Legislature." He was most fearful of abuses in the legislative branch. See ilfira note 60
and accompanying text.
55 U.S. CONST. amend. IX (emphasis added).
56 Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Dec. 5, 1789), reprinted in, 2
B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 1190.
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former shall not be extended. If no line can be drawn, a declara-
tion in either form would amount to nothing.57
Madison's use of a rights-powers distinction to explain the Ninth
Amendment, however, is not logically inconsistent with a robust
power-constraining view of the Ninth Amendment. Indeed, it sup-
ports such a view.
Madison was distinguishing two conceptual strategies for ac-
complishing a single objective. An expressed declaration of "rights
retained ... that ... shall not be abridged" has the same object in
view as an expression that "powers granted . . . shall not be ex-
tended." The object of both strategies is that "the rights retained
... be secure." Given this object, if one provision has teeth, so must
the other. In stark contrast, the rights-powers conception specifies
that the rights retained by the people automatically diminish as the
powers of government expand-a construction that contradicts the
stated purpose for declaring the existence of individual rights58 and
the very point Madison was making in his letter. Far from support-
ing a rights-powers conception of the Ninth Amendment, then, this
quotation reveals a fundamental flaw in any interpretation that ac-
knowledges the power-constraining function of enumerated powers
while denying this same function to unenumerated rights.
The rights-powers conception gains its plausibility, in part,
from the claim that the powers delegated by the Constitution pro-
vide sufficiently clear limitations on the scope of governmental activ-
ity. This claim was controversial when made and did not assuage
proponents of a bill of rights. The ever expanding scope of govern-
mental power over the past two hundred years has confirmed their
suspicions that more than delegated powers provisions were needed
to constrain the powers of government. We must now consider
whether the safeguard provided by judicial review on the basis of
enumerated constitutional rights alone is sufficient to this power-
constraining task or whether unenumerated rights may also provide
a basis for judicial review.
III
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF UNENUMERATED RIGHTS
Should a power-constraint conception of unenumerated rights
be enforced by judges or must the protection of unenumerated
rights be left to the political realm? To answer this question I shall
examine the principal dangers that Madison hoped a bill of rights
would help avoid and one way he thought such a device would ac-
57 Id.
58 See supra notes 39, 44-51, and accompanying text.
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complish this objective. Considering both the contemplated end
and the means envisioned for accomplishing this end, I shall suggest
that it is highly unlikely that the unenumerated rights were to be left
entirely to the political process.
Before doing so, it is useful to note that there is no logical con-
tradiction between the Federalist criticisms of a bill of rights and
judicial review on the basis of unenumerated rights. True, one
could argue that, although the Framers attached great importance
to protecting the rights retained by the people, they also believed
judicial review to be an inefficacious means of accomplishing this
end. There is nothing in the Federalist argument, however, to sug-
gest that judicial review could be based only on enumerated rights.
On the contrary, insofar as they believed in the judicial protection of
rights, the Federalists' fear that enumerating rights would diminish
other, unenumerated rights suggests only that they wanted these
unenumerated rights protected every bit as much as the enumerated
rights. In other words, in the absence of a bill of rights, a Federalist
who believed in the judicial protection of rights would have had to
envision enforcing only the unenumerated rights retained by the
people. 59
A. The Equal Protection of Enumerated and Unenumerated
Rights
The theory that the unenumerated rights retained by the peo-
ple were to be protected exclusively by recourse to the political pro-
cess or, perhaps, by recourse to popular insurrection seems unlikely
in light of the reasons given by Madison for needing a bill of rights.
Madison, for one, believed that, of the three branches of the na-
tional government, the greatest threat to liberty and to rights came
from the legislature. In his speech to the House, he states that "the
legislative [branch] .. .is the most powerful, and most likely to be
abused, because it is under the least control. Hence, so far as a dec-
laration of rights can tend to prevent the exercise of undue power, it
cannot be doubted but such declaration is proper." 60
Although he viewed the legislature as the most dangerous
branch of government, Madison saw the political power possessed
by "the majority" of the people to be the ultimate source of the
governmental threat to the rights and liberties of the people. In his
speech explaining the need for a bill of rights he said:
[I]n a Government modified like this of the United States, the
59 I thank Sheldon Richman for this point. See Sherry, supra note 36, at 1134-46
(discussing the practice of judicial review prevailing at the time of the framing).
60 Madison, supra note 10, at 454.
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great danger lies rather in the abuse of the community than in the
legislative body. The prescriptions in favor of liberty ought to be
levelled against that quarter where the greatest danger lies,
namely, that which possesses the highest prerogative of power.
But this is not found in either the executive or legislative depart-
ments of Government, but in the body of the people, operating by
the majority against the minority. 6 1
This was hardly an argument made in passing. Madison had
repeatedly expressed this view elsewhere in ways that amplify his
conception of rights. In The Federalist No. 10,62 he wrote:
By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether
amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united
and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest,
adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community. 63
Later, in a letter to Thomas Jefferson he wrote:
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger
of oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in the ma-
jority of the Community, and the invasion of private rights is
chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary
to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Govern-
ment is the mere instrument of the major number of the
Constituents. 64
These passages not only reiterate the danger Madison saw in
the political power of factious majorities, they also show that
Madison did not view rights as a product of majoritarian will. Nor
did he equate majority will with the common good. In the passage
above from The Federalist, he allowed the possibility that the interest
of a majority can be averse both to the "rights of other citizens" and
to the "permanent and aggregate interests of the community." 6 5 In
Madison's letter to Jefferson, he said that the impetus for "invasion
of private rights" is most likely to come from the "major number of
61 Id. at 454-55. His omission of any reference to the judiciary here suggests that
Madison saw the judicial department as no threat at all.
62 THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison), supra note 12.
63 Id. at 54.
64 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), reprinted in 1 B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 616.
65 THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison), supra note 12, at 54. In his letter to Jeffer-
son, Madison may also be seen as implicitly distinguishing between the "rights of citi-
zens" and the "permanent and aggregate interests of the community." Letter from
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), reprinted in B. SCHWARTZ, supra note
13, at 616. The existence of such a distinction, however, does not entail an irreconcila-
ble conflict between the two concepts. For example, one could view the protection of
the rights of citizens as the best, or even the exclusive, means of advancing the perma-
nent and aggregate interests of the community. In sum, protecting individual rights
could be viewed as the best means of securing and even discovering the common good.
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the Constituents. ' 66
Given that the most dangerous branch of the national govern-
ment was the legislature, it is unlikely that Madison would have envi-
sioned the protection of the rights retained by the people being
consigned exclusively to the legislature. Given that the governmen-
tal threat to the rights and liberties of the people was likely to be
promoted by the majority seeking to operate against the minority, it
is equally unlikely that Madison would have envisioned the protec-
tion of the rights retained by the people being consigned exclusively
to the device of popular insurrection. How then was a bill of rights
to help ameliorate this danger?
In his letter to Jefferson, Madison suggested several ways that a
bill of rights might prove useful, but he also expressed skepticism
about the effectiveness of written bills of rights in addressing the
bane of majoritarian abuses. "Repeated violations of these parch-
ment barriers," he wrote, "have been committed by overbearing
majorities in every State." 67 Jefferson replied that:
In the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights, you omit one
which has great weight with me, the legal check which it puts into
the hands of the judiciary. This is a body, which if rendered in-
dependent, and kept stricdy to their own department merits great
confidence for their learning and integrity. 68
After this correspondence, Madison used essentially the same
argument on the floor of the House. 69 Immediately after stressing
to the House the danger posed by "the abuse of the community,"
Madison stressed that "paper barriers" will favorably influence
"public opinion in their favor, and rouse the attention of the whole
community .... "-7 This was not, however, the only way a bill of
rights could protect the rights and liberties of the people. Moments
later he added, in an often quoted passage:
If they are incorporated into the constitution, independent tribu-
nals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the
guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark
against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive;
66 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), reprinted in B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 616.
67 Id.
68 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), reprinted in 1 B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 13, at 620.
69 Bernard Schwartz suggests that it was Jefferson's letter that led Madison to this
argument. See B. SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE AMERI-
CAN BILL OF RIGHTS 118 (1977).
70 Madison, supra note 10, at 455. It is important to note that Madison is here
speaking of the effectiveness of the entire bill of rights including the enumerated rights
provisions. This passage in no way suggests that unenumerated rights were limited to
this manner of protection.
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they will naturally be led to resist every encroachment upon rights
expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of
rights. 7 1
In sum, Madison viewed a bill of rights as a means of con-
straining legislative and executive abuses, whether intended to ben-
efit the officials or the majority of the community. The Bill of Rights
accomplished this end, in part, by putting enforcement of these
rights in the hands of independent tribunals of justice. In light of
this purpose, it seems unlikely that Madison anticipated that the
uneunumerated rights retained by the people were to be left entirely
to the will of the legislature or a majority of the community and that
only enumerated rights would receive judicial protection.
The principal support for such a claim is Madison's use of the
phrase "rights expressly stipulated" in the passage of his speech just
quoted. 72 Seizing upon this phrase, Raoul Berger argued that judi-
cial review was originally intended to be confined to the enumerated
rights.73 Although this passage is consistent with such an interpre-
tation, it hardly compels it. The proposal under consideration at
the time included an enumeration of expressly stipulated rights, so
it is natural that Madison would dwell on the advantages of such a
strategy. This in no way requires, however, that expressly stipulated
rights were to be the only rights receiving judicial protection.
Moreover, such an interpretation is implausible insofar as the
quoted passage immediately follows Madison's explanation of the
need for an express provision to deny any implication "that those
rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into
the hands of the General Government, and were consequently inse-
cure."' 74 Without judicial review of government interference with
the unenumerated rights retained by the people, the legislature
would be the judge in its own case-something that is not permitted
when enumerated rights are violated. 75 Madison saw the problem
of legislative partiality quite clearly:
No man is allowed to be ajudge in his own cause, because his
interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably,
corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body
of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time;
yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation but so
many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of
single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citi-
71 Id. at 457.
72 See supra text accompanying note 71.
73 See Berger, supra note 5, at 9.
74 Madison, supra note 10, at 456.
75 See supra notes 25 & 43 and accompanying text.
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zens? And what are the different classes of legislators but advo-
cates and parties to the causes which they determine? 76
In sum, Madison viewed a written bill of rights as a means of
constraining abuses by the legislature attempting to agrandize their
own interest or that of the majority. Crucial to the success of such a
strategy was the fact that such rights would be enforced by in-
dependent tribunals of justice. In light of this purpose and this
strategy, it seems highly unlikely that Madison anticipated that only
the enumerated rights would receive protection from independent
tribunals of justice and that any right retained by the people that
was otherwise omitted from the declaration would be protected
from legislative and majoritarian abuse solely by means of legislative
or majoritarian will.
An analysis that supports judicial review of legislative interfer-
ence with enumerated rights while denying equal judicial protection
to unenumerated rights is inherently suspect.77 The words of the
Ninth Amendment argue strongly against such a construction. As
Charles Black has noted:
[A]ffirmative settlement of the question (if, as I doubt, it was a real
question in 1790) of the rightness ofjudicial review, on the basis
of any right "enumerated" in the Constitution, would settle the
rightness of judicial review on the basis of those rights not enu-
merated, though "retained by the people," because anything else
would "deny or disparage" these latter, in a quite efficacious
way.78
To concede that enumerated rights are judicially enforceable
power-constraints, but unenumerated rights are not, is to "dimin-
ish" their "just importance" and surely to "disparage" them, if not
to "deny" them altogether. Denying judicial protection to the
unenumerated rights effectively surrenders them up to the general
government. As Calvin Massey concludes: "By assuming that the
ninth amendment can be invaded by congressional action and that
the first eight amendments cannot, Justice Reed made a distinction
fatally disparaging to ninth amendment rights. Unless its text be
76 THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison), supra note 12, at 57. True, when he wrote
this passage, Madison did not expect judicial review based on "parchment barriers" to
be an important check on legislation. But by the time he proposed his amendments he
had been brought around to this view. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
77 My use of "equal protection" here and elsewhere is not a reference to the Equal
Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While that clause refers to the equal
protection of the laws to be afforded all persons within thejurisdiction of any state, I am
referring to the equal protection of all rights protected by the Constitution.
78 Black, On Reading and Using the Ninth Amendment, in POWER AND POLICY IN QUEST
OF LAw: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF EUGENE VICTOR RoSTOW 188 (M. McDougal & W.N. Reis-
man eds. 1985).
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ignored, the ninth amendment forbids the distinction. ' 79
B. The Rights-Preserving Function of Unenumerated Rights
There is an understandable reluctance to open the pandora's
box ofjudicial review of such an open-ended provision as the Ninth
Amendment. Some fear that giving any real effect to the Ninth
Amendment would provide "a bottomless well in which the judici-
ary can dip for the formation of undreamed of 'rights' in their limit-
less discretion";80 that it would permit judges to impose their purely
subjective preferences on the people; that judicial review would
quickly become judicial supremacy and tyranny. How, then, does a
power-constraining conception of the Ninth Amendment square
with the separation of powers and the enforcement of enumerated
rights?
The first line of the constitutional defense of individual rights
and liberties was not the judicial protection of constitutional
rights-rights that needed to be added by amendment.81 Rather,
the governmental structure and procedures established by the Con-
stitution were the first line of defense. The preservation of state
governments, popular elections of representatives, election of sena-
tors by states, the electoral college, local control of suffrage, the
presidential veto, the power of the purse, and the impeachment
powers are just a sample of structural and procedural, rather than
substantive, restraints on government powers. Moreover, the un-
amended Constitution, at least implicitly, limited the government of
the United States to its delegated powers.
Some, however, were not satisfied with these elaborate struc-
tural protections alone. They wanted and demanded more. In urg-
ing a reluctant House to take up the question of a bill of rights,
Madison observed:
It cannot be a secret to the gentlemen of this House, that,
notwithstanding the ratification of this system of Government by
eleven of the thirteen United States, . . . yet still there is a great
number of our constituents who are dissatisfied with it .... We
ought not to disregard their inclination, but, on principles of am-
ity and moderation, conform to their wishes, and expressly de-
clare the great rights of mankind secured under this
79 Massey, supra note 5, at 323 n.97.
80 Berger, supra note 5, at 2.
81 This does not mean that constitutional rights would have been unprotected in
the absence of enumeration. For, as noted above, if the Federalists' argument that a bill
of rights was unnecessary is accepted as sincere, then, in the absence of any enumerated
rightsjudicial protection of the rights of the people would have been exclusively on the
basis of unenumerated rights. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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constitution. 82
The critics wanted a safeguard. "I believe," Madison said, "that the
great mass of the people who opposed... [the Constitution], dis-
liked it because it did not contain effectual provisions against en-
croachments on particular rights .... -83
The Constitution as amended, therefore, was a product of con-
flicting, but ultimately reconcilable, intents. On the one hand, if the
constitutional structure worked as its Framers hoped and intended,
there would be little, if any, need to protect constitutional rights by
judicial review. On the other hand, if government exceeded its
proper boundaries and threatened the liberty and rights of the peo-
ple as its critics feared, then a declaration of constitutional rights
might provide an invaluable second line of defense.
Accordingly, even if the designers of the original constitutional
structure did not contemplate aggressive judicial protection of indi-
vidual rights from legislative acts-even if they "would have rejected
[it] out of hand" 84-it does not follow that such judicial review is not
a legitimate constitutional device from the perspective of the origi-
nal scheme. For these Framers also did not contemplate that the
structure they designed would fail to constrain the power of govern-
ment as they hoped it would. If time has proved them wrong and
their critics right on this count, then we must thank the critics for
insisting on a fall-back scheme of constitutional rights and James
Madison for insisting that a reluctant House take up the issue.
Consider the following analogy. A group of ship designers de-
vise a structure intended to ensure that the ship will stay afloat for-
ever. Suppose they still add lifeboats and life-preservers to the ship.
As far as they are concerned, this is an entirely redundant exercise.
They have absolutely no intention that passengers should ever use
the lifeboats or life-preservers. In fact, they fervently hope and be-
lieve that these devices will never be used. Years after the designers
have died, as passengers board the ship, they too do not intend to
use the lifeboats or life-preservers. Without instruction by a knowl-
edgeable crew, future generations may not even know that these de-
vices are on board or how to use them. After a long enough period,
however, even the crew may become complacent and forgetful.
Suppose now that the unintended event occurs and the ship be-
82 Madison, supra note 10, at 449. This quotation also undermines the claim that
the rights "retained by the people" are peculiarly English.
83 Id. at 450. Once again, the fact that Madison refers to the perceived threat to
"particular rights" does not mean that the other rights retained by people were to be left
unprotected from encroachment. The Ninth Amendment was intended to negate this
inference.
84 Berger, supra note 5, at 2.
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gins to sink. Would it make any sense to argue that passengers
should refuse the lifeboats or life preservers because it was "never
intended" that they use them? Would the "evidence" of this "lack
of intent" provided by the designers' vigorous pre-voyage state-
ments that the ship is seaworthy or even "unsinkable" support such
an argument? Would such an argument be supported by the fact
that the designers had spent virtually all of their time trying to per-
fect the ship's structure and hardly any time worrying about the life-
boats? Would it be supported by the fact that many or all of the
ship's designers actually opposed having lifeboats and life-preserv-
ers on board?
No, such an argument would be a non sequitur. Although the
designers spent little time fussing with the life preservers and never
intended that passengers ever use them, although they were pro-
vided "merely for greater caution," although the designers continu-
ally insisted they were entirely unnecessary, and although the life
preservers might even have been an afterthought imposed upon the
designers by an overly cautious shipowner to assuage the "unrea-
sonable" fears of prospective passengers and induce their pa-
tronage, those who insisted they be on board certainly intended that
the passengers use them if, God forbid, it should become necessary.
In addition to the light it casts on arguments purporting to rest
on the intent of the Framers, this analogy teaches a number of other
lessons about the relationship of constitutional rights and the Ninth
Amendment to the rest of the constitutional structure. First, it casts
judicial review of legislation in the role of a "rights preserver." The
fact that the Framers of the Constitution unquestionably preferred
structural constraints to "paper barriers"85 enforced by judges does
not mean that they would have us ignore judicial review of these
paper barriers if their structural constraints were found wanting in
practice. Second, this analogy puts into proper perspective the early
disuse of the Ninth Amendment (and the other amendments as
well).8 6 Just as life preservers are not the preferred means of keep-
ing passengers afloat, judicial review was not the preferred means of
protecting the liberties of the people. Both are fallback devices.
Third, just as lifeboats are preferred to life preservers, many
have thought that it is safer to protect liberty by abstract interpreta-
tions of enumerated rights than by speculating about unenumerated
rights. This technique, however, has its limits. Enumerated rights
cannot always be interpreted to protect some very fundamental lib-
85 Madison, supra note 10, at 455. It is worth noting that the strategy of holding
government to its enumerated powers also rests on paper barriers.
86 It was, after all, 1965 before the Supreme Court first used the First Amendment
to invalidate an act of Congress in Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
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erties without straining them beyond their reasonable capacity. But
straining the text by pushing enumerated rights too far can under-
mine the perceived legitimacy of any judicial review based on tex-
tual analysis.
Fourth, after a long period in which the Ninth Amendment and
other rights-preserving passages of the text were neither needed
nor used, it is understandable why they would be almost forgotten.
Yet this does not mean that the impetus for the Ninth Amendment
was a momentary and passing sentiment. Seventy years after the
adoption of the Ninth Amendment, the framers of another Ameri-
can constitution included virtually identical language: "The
enumeration, in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the people of the
several States."87
C. What Justifies Judicial Negation of Legislation?
The power-constraint conception described above suggests two
developments that would justify reliance on judicial negation of leg-
islation or executive acts on the basis of either enumerated or
unenumerated rights: first, when the legislative or executive branch
abuses its delegated powers by using improper means that violate
the rights of the people; and second, when the legislative or execu-
tive branch exceeds its rightful powers to pursue unconstitutional
ends that violate the rights of the people.
These developments are likely to result from a gradual but per-
sistent erosion of both structural constraints and the paper barriers
of delegated powers. Over the past fifty years, for example, we have
witnessed an enormous expansion in the scope of federal powers-
especially the implied powers found in the Necessary and Proper
Clause-and a corresponding inattention to structural constraints.
This development, coupled with the failure to ackiowledge an ex-
panded scope to the implied rights referred to in the Ninth Amend-
87 CONST. OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA art. VI, § 5 (1861). Section 6 of
Article VI reads: "The powers not delegated to the Confederate States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the
people thereof." CONST. OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA art. VI, § 6 (1861);
reprinted in 1J. DAVIS, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 672 (1958).
Moreover, the Ninth Amendment came also to be widely copied in state constitutions
drafted after its adoption. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 33; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 33;
ARK. CONST. art. II, § 29; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 28; FLA. CONST. art I, § 1, par. XXVIII;
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 24; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 25; KAN. CONST. bill of rights, § 20; LA.
CONST. art. I, § 24; MD. CONST. declaration of rights, art. 45; MICH. CONST. art I, § 23;
MIss. CONST. art. 3, § 32; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 26; NEV. CONST. art I, § 20; N.J. CONST.
art. I, par. 21; N.M. CONST. art. I, § 23; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 20; OKLA. CONST. art. II,
§ 33; OR. CONST. art. I, § 33; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 25; Wyo.
CONST. art. I, § 36.
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ment, has resulted in a constitutional structure that is ever more
lopsided in the direction of increased government power.
Two different strategies may be used alone or together to re-
store some semblance of balance. Courts could cleave more rigor-
ously than they have in recent decades to the original structural
constraints of the Constitution-for example, the courts could more
strictly enforce principles of separation of powers, federalism, and
enumerated powers. This would reestablish a regime of limited
government and greatly reduce (though not entirely eliminate) the
need for judicial review based on constitutional rights-especially
unenumerated rights.
On the other hand, if the expanded scope of governmental
powers is maintained, courts must correspondingly expand the pro-
tection of both enumerated and unenumerated constitutional rights.
This would entail, for example, a vigorous interpretation of the First
Amendment, the Takings Clause, and the procedural rights estab-
lished by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. In the comparatively
few remaining cases in which an honest interpretation of these pro-
visions does not authorize serious scrutiny of governmental intru-
sion on individual liberties, the Ninth Amendment stands ready as a
supplement.
Presumably, those who wrote the Constitution would consider
the latter approach to be a second-best departure from the original
structure. The structure they devised, however, has been perma-
nently altered by such later developments as the Civil War Amend-
ments, universal suffrage, the direct election of senators, and the
creation of a national income tax. Even if those original structural
restraints that have survived on paper were given new life, we can-
not-and, in some significant respects, we would not want to-re-
turn to the original scheme. Moreover, the Constitution would not
have been ratified without this second-best means of coping with
expanded governmental powers because of those who withheld
their consent until promised that rights-preserving amendments
were forthcoming. And it was James Madison, the man who was
converted to their cause, who kept that promise.
IV
INTERPRETING UNENUMERATED RIGHTS
Assuming that we wish to apply a power-constraint conception
to the rights retained by the people, is there a practical way to do
so? In this Part, I shall describe three possible methods of identify-
ing unenumerated rights: the originalist method, the constructive
method, and the presumptive method. These interpretive methods
are not mutually exclusive. Although they may be used alone, they
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may also be used to complement each other. Before describing
these methods, however, let me first turn to a philosophical concern
that some may think impedes any effort to identify unenumerated
rights.
A. What if the Ninth Amendment was a Philosophical Mistake?
The Ninth Amendment refers to unspecified rights "retained by
the people"; rights that the people had before forming a govern-
ment.88 One of the sources of intellectual resistance to ajusticiable
interpretation of the Ninth Amendment today is not constitutional,
but philosophical. Until quite recently, many, if not most, modern
philosophers insisted that there were no such things as natural
rights; that in fact, government is the ultimate source of all rights.
Given a philosophical skepticism about rights, the reference in
the Ninth Amendment to unspecified retained rights is no different
from a constitutional prohibition of discrimination against ghosts.
"Suppose," argues John Ely, "there were in the Constitution one or
more provisions providing for the protection of ghosts. Can there
be any doubt, now that we no longer believe there is any such thing,
that we would be behaving properly in ignoring the provisions?" 89
For one who denies the existence of rights antecedent to govern-
ment, a reference to unspecified retained rights is no different from
"an amendment that says 'Congress shall make no' and then there is
an inkblot, and you cannot read the rest of it, and that is the only
copy you have. ... 90 This philosophical objection lurks behind
many of the objections to judicial review of the rights retained by
the people.9 1
According to this view, the Ninth Amendment is simply a mis-
88 In the balance of this Article, I assume that the phrase "rights retained by the
people" refers to rights that are antecedent to the formation of government and I will
not consider the difficulties raised by such an interpretation. Although, in my view, this
is the most plausible interpretation of this phrase it is not the only possible one. Russell
Caplan has argued that this phrase refers to rights created by state governments prior to
the formation of the government of the United States. See Caplan, supra note 5.
One difficulty (among others) with a state-law rights interpretation of the rights
retained by the people is that, as Caplan acknowledges, these rights would fail to con-
strain the powers of either the federal or state governments. See id. at 261-62. Accord-
ing to this interpretation, Madison drafted, Congress approved, and the states ratified
an essentially moot provision; consequently, this interpretation is subject to much of the
same infirmities as a rights-powers conception of the Ninth Amendment. For other diffi-
culties with this interpretation, see Sager, You Can Raise the First, Hide Behind the Fourth,
and Plead the Fifth. But What on Earth Can You Do With the Ninth Amendment?, 64 CHi.-KETrr
L. REV. 239, 243-51 (1988).
89 J. ELY, supra note 18, at 39.
90 Bork, supra note 2.
91 See S. MACEDO, THE NEw RIGHT v. THE CONSTITtrrroN 39-48 (rev. ed. 1987) (con-
trasting the philosophical skepticism of some modem constitutional theorists with the
philosophical views of the Framers).
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take 92 and the nature of this mistake prevents any nonarbitrary in-
terpretation of the rights retained by the people. If rights
antecedent to government are mere illusions or ghosts, then judicial
enforcement of these alleged "rights" can only be wholly subjective
and arbitrary. Courts would be, in effect, "mak[ing] up what might
be under the inkblot." 93 Decisions that are unavoidably based on
subjective preferences, the argument continues, ought to be made
by the representative branch of government so as to reflect the pref-
erences of the majority.
I reject the premises of this argument, but let us assume that
the skeptics are correct and that rights independent of government
are mere phantoms. Even so, because the Framers believed in the
existence of "other" rights "retained by the people," 94 the structure
they created would take on an entirely different and unintended cast
if the reality and acceptance of Ninth Amendment rights were not
assumed. This fact should matter to those who allow a role for
Framers' intent and to those who view the Constitution as a kind of
contract entered into at the time of ratification, two views of the
Constitution that are often hard to separate. Of course, many con-
stitutional theorists take neither approach, but I would wager that
those theorists who are also moral skeptics are disproportionately in
one or both of these camps. Because they deny the possibility of
discerning genuine rights independent of government, they require
some other more palpable touchstone for finding constitutional val-
ues, be it original intent or some notion of consent or both.
The relevance of the Framers' beliefs in natural rights to inter-
pretations based on original intent is obvious. If the Framers in-
tended that unenumerated rights be protected by the judiciary, then
to honor that intent requires that we make some effort to discern
and protect at least the kinds of rights the Framers had in mind
when they ratified the Ninth Amendment. The obviousness of this
position may explain the lengths to which some adherents to origi-
92 Ronald Dworkin distinguishes two kinds of mistakes: "[E]mbedded mistakes are
those whose specific authority is fixed so that it survives their loss of gravitational force;
corrigible mistakes are those whose specific authority depends on gravitational force in
such a way that it cannot survive this loss."
R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 121 (1977). Dworkin goes on to claim that ac-
cording to a theory of legislative supremacy, statutory mistakes "will lose their gravita-
tional force but not their specific authority." Id. Presumably, the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy would lead to the same conclusion with regard to the Ninth
Amendment. Thus, even if the Ninth Amendment is a mistake, it would not lose all of its
authority. Perhaps the interpretations that deprive the Ninth Amendment of any effect
while purporting to respect it can be viewed in Dworkin's theory as an effort to deprive
this mistake of any gravitation force.
93 Bork, supra note 2.
94 See, e.g., Corvin, supra note 36; Grey, supra note 36; Sherry, supra note 36; Van
Loan, supra note 5.
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nal intent have gone to defend the rights-powers theory.95
A similar analysis applies if one interprets the text of the Con-
stitution as one would a contract. Determining the consensual
terms or original meaning of any agreement requires that one take
into account the background assumptions of the parties. Given the
widespread belief in individual rights that prevailed at the time of
the drafting of the Constitution, it is reasonable to assume that, if
those who vehemently insisted on a bill of rights to protect the liber-
ties of the people had shared the philosophical skepticism of mod-
em philosophy (or anticipated its coming), they would not have
rested content with the abbreviated list of rights they received.
They surely would have insisted on a greatly expanded list of enu-
merated rights. Only a handful of the many rights proposed by state
ratification conventions were eventually incorporated in the Bill of
Rights.96 The Ninth Amendment was offered precisely to "compen-
sate" these critics for the absence of an extended list of rights. Put-
ting this in contract terms, the Ninth Amendment "clause" served as
the "consideration" for not insisting on a more elaborate statement
of rights. 97
The adoption of the Ninth Amendment forces those who reject
the reality of such rights, but who seek to interpret the Constitution
according to either original intent or original meaning, to hypothe-
size on the content of this expanded list. Without such an attempt,
the scheme of delegated powers and reserved rights becomes funda-
mentally different from the one that the Framers promised and the
people involved in the ratification process agreed on. Modem phil-
osophical skepticism about rights is simply beside the point. Just as
contract law seeks to enforce the "benefit of the bargain" as agreed
to, enforcing the Constitution as enacted would seem to require
protection of the retained rights and liberties of the people assumed
by the Ninth Amendment in the same manner as we would if we
believed these rights and liberties to be "real." From the perspec-
tive of either original intent or original meaning, ignoring the Ninth
Amendment because it does not comport with modern moral phi-
losophy is, to shift the metaphor, constitutional bait and switch.
95 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 5; Cooper, supra note 16. See also OFFICE OF LEGAL
POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WRONG TURNS ON THE ROAD TO JUDICIAL ACTIVISM:
THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 8-27 (1987).
96 In fact, the list of amendments proposed by the state ratifying conventions was
quite lengthy. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
97 Cf. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 211, 223-30
(1988) (analogizing differing approaches to the parol evidence rule to differing ap-
proaches to contractual interpretation).
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B. Three Methods of Interpreting Unenumerated Rights
Few will abandon the safe harbor of the rights-powers concep-
tion of the Ninth Amendment unless they are convinced that some
practical method exists for determining the unenumerated rights re-
tained by the people. In this section, I shall consider three methods
for discerning the content of the unenumerated rights. One method
suggested by the previous section we may call the originalist method
of interpreting unenumerated rights. A second method, which be-
gins where the originalist method leaves off, is the constructive
method. The third and, perhaps, most practical approach is the pre-
sumptive method. Although none of these methods is entirely with-
out difficulty, any problems they pose are not unique to interpreting
unenumerated rights. As Charles Black has observed:
Maybe we ought to give up, and let the Ninth Amendment-and
the priceless rights it refers to-keep gathering dust for a third
century.
But there is one thing to note about the very real troubles
that face us when we turn to the search that the Ninth Amendment
seems to command. These are the troubles not of the Ninth Amendment
itself, but of law.98
1. The Originalist Method
If moral skeptics are correct and unenumerated rights are non-
existent, then it would seem that determining the content of such
rights would be truly impossible. However, according to the meth-
odology of those seeking either the original intent or the original
meaning of the Ninth Amendment, they no more need to discern
the content of actual or real rights, than they need to discern
searches that are "really" unreasonable or activity that is "really"
commerce. Instead, they seek the Framers' understanding of the
text. However difficult it may be, the task of interpreting the Ninth
Amendment in this way is no different from the task of interpreting
many other provisions of the Constitution.
Just as those concerned with original intent consult such mater-
ials as Madison's notes on the Federal Constitutional Convention,
we may also consult the lengthy lists of proposed amendments sent
to Congress by several state ratification conventions. 99 Virginia, for
example, proposed twenty provisions for "a declaration or bill of
rights asserting, and securing from encroachment, the essential and
98 Black, supra note 78, at 189.
99 See 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTION 549 (J. Elliot ed. 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter J. Elliot] (amendments
proposed by Maryland convention); 3J. Elliot at 657 (amendments proposed by Virginia
convention); 4 J. Elliot at 242 (amendments proposed by North Carolina convention).
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unalienable rights of the people."' 100 Only a handful of the many
proposed rights were incorporated into the Bill of Rights. In addi-
tion, the rights expressly stipulated by state constitutions at the time
of the Constitution's ratification are potentially significant.10 Some
of these rights were conceived of as retained by the people against
state government. Certainly rights retained against state govern-
ments were not surrendered to the general government. 102
These various lists are not, of course, definitive. After all, most
of these rights were left out of the Bill of Rights and it is nearly
impossible to know why a deicison was made to exclude a particular
right. Nonetheless, the Ninth Amendment was intended to remove
the need to enumerate every right retained by the people.103 Thus,
the mere fact that a right was excluded from the enumeration does
not support a strong negative implication.
Moreover, just as those concerned with original intent consult
such theoretical writings as The Federalist to interpret passages of the
text, we may also consult the Framers' theoretical writings on natu-
ral rights that were contemporaneous with the Ninth Amendment,
such as those by James Wilson quoted earlier. 0 4 Some of these
writings are quite comprehensive and specific. Wilson, for example,
summarized his analysis as follows:
In his unrelated state, man has a natural right to his property, to
his character, to liberty, and to safety. From his peculiar relations,
as a husband, as a father, as a son, he is entitled to the enjoyment
of peculiar rights, and obliged to the performance of peculiar du-
ties. These will be specified in their due course. From his general
relations, he is entitled to other rights, simple in their principle,
but, in their operation, fruitful and extensive.... In these general
relations, his rights are, to be free from injury, and to receive the
fulfilment [sic] of the engagements, which are made to him; his
duties are, to do no injury, and to fulfil [sic] the engagements,
which he has made. On these two pillars principally and respec-
tively rest the criminal and the civil codes of the municipal law.
These are the pillars of justice. 10 5
100 3 J. Elliot, supra note 99, at 657.
101 See, e.g., THE CONsTrrunTONS OF THE SEVERAL INDEPENDENT STATES OF AMERICA;
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE; THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION BETWEEN THE
SAID STATES; THE TREATISE BETWEEN His MOST CHRISTIAN MAJESTY AND THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA (1781).
102 Russell Caplan and Calvin Massey agree on the relevance of state constitutional
and common law rights to Ninth Amendment analysis but draw opposite conclusions on
the implication of these rights for constitutional adjudication. See Caplan, supra note 5,
at 254-56; Massey, supra note 5, at 322.
103 See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
104 See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
105 Wilson, supra note 37, at 308.
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Of course, some may argue that any discussion of rights based
on this sort of historical inquiry would simply be too open-ended to
provide judges with adequate guidance in interpreting the Ninth
Amendment. However, adherents to original intent are hard-
pressed to make such an argument. Their position requires that we
engage in just such an enterprise to interpret the rest of the Consti-
tution-including the open-ended Necessary and Proper Clause.
There is, then, no shortage of textual materials contemporane-
ous with ratification of the Ninth Amendment that would permit an
elaboration of the rights retained by the people. These materials
are comparable in every respect to those traditionally used to inter-
pret the original intent of other provisions and there is no inkblot
preventing us from reading them. Abandoning the originalist
method only when considering the Ninth Amendment may reach
the desired result of greatly limiting the scope of constitutional
rights but only at the price of a consistent originalist methodology.
2. The Constructive Method
With the constructive method, we try to construct a coherent
conception of rights from historical and hypothetical examples as
well as theoretical materials, and then apply this conception to the
facts of an individual case to reach a legal result. For example, we
may begin with the historical materials described in the previous
section and from these materials begin to construct a theory of the
kinds of rights retained by the people. We may also take into ac-
count the examples of unenumerated rights that have been acknowl-
edged by the courts over the past 200 years. 10 6 Many of these-
106 One authority provides the following list of unenumerated rights that have al-
ready been recognized by the courts:
1. The right to retain American citizenship, despite even criminal ac-
tivities, until explicitly and voluntarily renouncing it;
2. The right to receive equal protection not only from the states but
also from the federal government;
3. The right to vote, subject only to reasonable restrictions to prevent
fraud, and to cast a ballot equal in weight to those of other citizens;
4. The right to a presumption of innocence and to demand proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt before being convicted of a crime;
5. The right to use the federal courts and other governmental institu-
tions and to urge others to use these processes to protect their
interests;
6. The right to associate with others;
7. The right to enjoy a zone of privacy;
8. The right to travel within the United States;
9. The right to marry or not to marry;
10. The right to make one's own choice about having children;
11. The right to educate one's children as long as one meets certain
minimum standards set by the state;
12. The right to choose and follow a profession;
13. The right to attend and report on criminal trials.
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such as the right to travel within the United States and the right to
the equal protection of the laws from the federal government-are
now well accepted and provide paradigm examples or "easy cases"
from which theories of unenumerated rights can be developed.' 0 7
Whatever controversy still surrounds these acknowledged-but-
unenumerated rights typically concerns not the rights themselves
but either a particular application of these rights to new circum-
stances or, more generally, the legitimacy of judges protecting
rights that are not written in the text.' 08
There are at least three reasons why our analysis of unenumer-
ated rights may not be confined to historical examples but must also
subject such examples to the theoretical scrutiny of the constructive
method. First, the rule of law requires that the enforcement of legal
rights be as internally consistent and coherent as possible. This
means that we cannot escape the task of rationalizing as best we can
these received historical examples of rights. Legal theory is the
principal means by which this is accomplished.
Second, as I have discussed elsewhere, 10 9 we must be con-
cemed with the actual, as opposed to the apparent, legitimacy that
constitutional processes impart on legislation. The mere fact that
the individual cannot successfully resist the coercion of government
does not explain why a citizen or government official is "bound in
conscience" 110 to obey legislation produced by constitutional
processes. Might does not explain right; nor does the fact that a
majority of some minority once cast a vote in favor of the
Constitution.
If the Constitution imparts legitimacy on legislation such that
legislation commands an ongoing moral obligation of obedience, it
must be because the processes established by the Constitution pro-
duce results that are sufficiently consistent with a background set of
individual rights that are both procedural and substantive in nature,
corresponding to what Lon Fuller called the internal and external
moralities of law."'1 If this view of constitutional legitimacy is cor-
rect, then the Ninth Amendment enhances the legitimacy of legisla-
tion by strengthening the link between enacted law that survives
See W. MURPHY, J. FLEMING & W. HARRIS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
1083-84 (1986) (listing and providing citations for these unenumerated rights).
107 See Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985) (describing and defending
the use of easy cases in settling some constitutional issues).
108 1 discuss the use of paradigm or easy cases and the existence of hard cases of
unenumerated rights in Barnett, supra note 11, at 57-64.
109 Barnett, supra note 11, at 39-40.
110 The phrase is taken from Thomas Aquinas. See Aquinas, Summa Theologica, in 20
GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 233 (R. Hutchins ed. 1980).
111 See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 96-97 (rev. ed. 1969).
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judicial review and the imperatives of justice based on individual
rights. This objective can only be accomplished if received histori-
cal examples about unenumerated rights are subjected to rational
analysis such as that provided by moral theory.
Finally, whether or not we are bound to enforce written, rule-
like constitutional strictures that our best legal or moral analysis
reveals to be mistaken, we are not bound to adhere to the errors of
our forebears in the realm of unenumerated rights. Unwritten
mistakes are not embedded." 2 James Wilson's views of natural
rights,1 3 for example, are both sophisticated and illuminating. We
are not, however, compelled to embrace any sexism that we may
find in his words. As with the common law process, an attempt to
construct a theory of the retained rights from historical examples
requires the use of critical reason to eliminate mistakes-particu-
larly when starting the analysis of unenumerated rights in
midstream.
3. The Presumptive Method
Although I think a constructive method of interpretation has its
place, 1 4 many would question the competence ofjudges to engage
in the interpretive enterprise that a constructive method would
seem to require. Moreover, sharp theoretical disagreement seems
inevitable. Although such disagreement does not undermine the ac-
tual legitimacy of unenumerated rights, it does serve to weaken the
apparent legitimacy of their protection by judges.
There is good reason for doubting that one could specify in ad-
vance all of the rights retained by the people. In a classical liberal
theory of rights, rights define a sphere of moral jurisdiction that per-
sons have over certain resources in the world-including their bod-
ies. This jurisdiction establishes boundaries within which persons
are free to do what they wish. So long as persons are acting within
their respective jurisdictional spheres, their acts are deemed to be
"rightful" (as distinguished from "good") and others may not use
force to interfere. 15 According to this approach, our specific rights
are as numerous as the various acts we may perform within our re-
112 See supra note 92 for a discussion of different kinds of mistakes. I leave aside the
issue of whether a precedent mistakenly granting protection to a purported right creates
an embedded mistake that merits some degree of protection.
113 See supra notes 37, 38, 105 and accompanying text.
H 4 As I shall briefly discuss below, the constructive method is particularly appropri-
ate for construing unenumerated procedural rights. See infra notes 126-32 and accompa-
nying text.
115 There is, of course, much more to be said about this conception of rights. I have
defended the reasonableness of this type of rights-based approach elsewhere. See Bar-
nett, Pursuing Justice in a Free Society: Part I-Power v. Liberty, 4 GRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Sum-
mer/Fall 1985, at 50.
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spective jurisdictions. Although our actions must remain within
proper jurisdictional bounds, within those bounds our rights are as
varied as our imaginations. Given this conception of rights-a con-
ception in keeping with that held at the time of the framing of the
Ninth Amendment-it is simply impossible to specify in advance all
the rights we have. As natural rights theorist James Wilson put it:
... there are very few who understand the whole of these rights.
All the political writers, from Grotious and Puffendorf down to Vattel,
have treated on this subject; but in no one of those books, nor in
the aggregate of them all, can you find a complete enumeration of
rights appertaining to the people as men and as citizens.
Enumerate all the rights of men! I am sure, sirs, that no gen-
tleman in the late Convention would have attempted such a
thing. 116
According to this conception of rights, then, it may be impossible to
enumerate all the rights we have and undesirable to try. It may also
be unnecessary.
Instead of authorizing a search for particular rights, the Ninth
Amendment can be viewed as establishing a general constitutional
presumption in favor of individual liberty." 7 According to the pre-
sumptive approach, individuals are constitutionally privileged to en-
gage in rightful behavior-acts that are within their sphere of moral
jurisdiction-and such behavior is presumptively immune from gov-
ernmental interference. Identifying rightful conduct by determin-
ing the proper contours of this moral jurisdiction is what
distinguishes liberty from license. This kind of inquiry is exactly
what common law courts have been doing for centuries with occa-
sional assistance from legislatures. The freedom to act within the
boundaries provided by one's common law rights may be viewed as
a central background presumption of the Constitution-a presump-
tion that is reflected in the Ninth Amendment.
This does not mean, however, that all legislative alterations of
common law rights are constitutionally prohibited. Common law
processes assumed that legislation can occasionally be used to cor-
rect doctrinal errors perpetuated by a strong doctrine of precedent,
to establish needed conventions, and to achieve uniformity among
diverse legal systems. But legislation must be scrutinized by in-
116 2 J. Elliot, supra note 99, at 424 (remarks ofJ. Wilson).
117 Indeed, presumptions of this sort may be all that rules of law ever establish. See
Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U. CH. L. REV. 556 (1973) (describing the opera-
tion of staged pleadings in legal analysis). See also Barnett, A Consent Themy of Contract, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 269, 309-19 (1986) (applying a presumptive methodology to contractual
obligation). Cf. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARv. L. REv. 949 (1985) (dis-
tinguishing between "flat" and "structured" legal thinking).
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dependent tribunals of justice to see whether, in the guise of per-
forming these permissible functions, the legislature is seeking
instead to invade individual rights. Legislation in pursuit of ends
deemed by the Constitution to be appropriate-and defined at the
federal level by the enumerated powers provisions-may rebut the
presumption in favor of rightful activity when such legislation passes
the sort of meaningful scrunity we associate with the infringement of
other constitutional rights. As legislative activity becomes less ex-
traordinary, however, increased skepticism of the purported justifi-
cations of legislation is warranted. Legislative inflation results in a
general diminution of legislative value.
According to the presumptive method, then, the unenumerated
rights of the Ninth Amendment that protect individual liberty oper-
ate identically to enumerated rights. For example, courts have not
construed the First Amendment as literally barring any abridgment
of "the freedom of speech." Such ancient common law principles as
those governing fraud, copyright, and defamation provide bounda-
ries (some of which are now codified in statutes) beyond which
rightful exercises of free speech may not go. Nonetheless, the First
Amendment establishes a constitutional presumption in favor of
speech that is within these common law boundaries. When legisla-
tion operates to restrict speech, such legislation is subjected to
meaningful judicial scrutiny. The executive branch of government
must justify to the judiciary any legislative or executive interference
with such free speech. The bare fact that such legislation reflects a
majority preference is insufficient to overcome the presumption es-
tablished by the First Amendment. Moreover, the bare assertion
that legislation abridging freedom of speech serves a legitimate leg-
islative end is also insufficient. When the First Amendment is impli-
cated we maintain a healthy skepticism of legislative motivations.
In the same manner, the Ninth Amendment establishes a con-
stitutional presumption in favor of other rightful activities. This
presumption requires the executive branch of the government to
justify to the judiciary any legislative or executive interference. The
bare fact that such legislation reflects a majority preference is insuf-
ficient to overcome the presumption established by the Ninth
Amendment. Moreover, the bare assertion that such legislation
serves a legitimate legislative end would also be insufficient. As with
restrictions on speech, skepticism of legislative motivations is war-
ranted when unenumerated rights are abridged.
In sum, the presumptive approach to the Ninth Amendment
does not require an elaborate philosophical inquiry into the rights
of mankind. It is critical rather than constructive. It simply requires
that governmental abridgment of personal or associational liberty
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be justified to a neutral third party. With such a constitutional pre-
sumption, freedom from unjustified governmental interference is
not limited to speech or to the free exercise of religion but extends
to all aspects of a citizen's life. As Steven Macedo has proposed,
"judges would critically examine the reasons and the evidence of-
fered to support restrictions on liberty; they would infuse a measure
of real 'critical bite' into their review of all governmental restrictions
on constitutional liberty." 118
Charles Black has suggested a similar approach to the Ninth
Amendment with his "proportionality principle":
It seems to me that a serious and thoroughly general commitment to
liberty is inconsistent with restrictions or deprivations grossly out
of proportion, in their impact on persons, to the benefits that may
reasonably be anticipated by the society that imposes them....
[T]here is likely to be no difficulty in identifying at least some in-
stances in which most people would agree that the gross dispro-
portion is visible-sometimes.even grotesque. 119
The main difference between Professor Black's approach and mine
is that the presumptive approach clearly places the burden ofjustifi-
cation on the government. In any event, Black's concluding remarks
apply equally to both proposals. "If we are committed to anything,"
he insists, "it is to the idea of 'liberty.' If that commitment doesn't
really refer to anything except a good inner feeling, then we ought
to shut up about it. '"120
As a practical matter, we must choose between two fundamen-
tally different constructions of the Constitution, each resting on a
different presumption. We either accept the presumption that in
pursuing happiness persons may do whatever is not justly prohib-
ited or we are left with a presumption that the government may do
whatever is not expressly prohibited. 12 1 The presence of the Ninth
Amendment in the Constitution strongly supports the first of these
two presumptions. According to this interpretation of the Ninth
Amendment, the Constitution established what Steven Macedo has
called islands of governmental powers "surrounded by a sea of indi-
vidual rights."' 122 It did not establish "islands [of rights] sur-
rounded by a sea of governmental powers."' 123
118 S. MACEDO, supra note 91.
119 Black, supra note 78, at 193.
120 Id. at 192.
121 See, e.g., Graglia,Judicial Review on the Basis of "Regime Principles"." A Prescription for
Government by Judges, 26 S. TEx. L.J. 435, 436 (1985) ("Very few occasions for... [judi-
cial review] would arise, because the Constitution contains few limitations on self-gov-
ernment, and those limitations are almost never violated.").
122 S. MACEDO, supra note 91, at 27.
123 Id.
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The Ninth Amendment is sometimes dismissed as a mere rule
of construction. However, by eliminating the second of these two
possible constructions of the Constitution and by supporting a pre-
sumption in favor of personal and associational liberty, the rule of
construction provided by the Ninth Amendment may be one of the
most important provisions in the text.
4. Choosing Between the Constructive and Presumptive Methods
Given that there is more than one method available to interpret
unenumerated rights, which one is the best? I have already given
reasons why the originalist method is insufficient. 124 The choice be-
tween the constructive and presumptive methods of interpretation
may reflect, at least in part, the dual function of constitutional
rights. As was discussed above,1 25 constitutional rights constrain
the powers of government in two ways: by reinforcing the limita-
tions on the delegated powers or ends of government and by plac-
ing additional restrictions on the means by which government may
pursue its delegated ends.
The presumptive method is particularly effective at reinforcing
and extending the limitations on delegated powers. By presuming
the immunity of rightful conduct from governmental restriction, it
forces the government to credibly articulate its purpose and defend
any exercise of governmental power as both necessary and proper.
However, because restrictions on the means by which government
may pursue its delegated ends often cannot be cast in terms of pre-
sumptive immunities from governmental action, the presumptive
method is less helpful in establishing the proper manner or mode of
government activity. Supplementing the enumerated procedural
protections afforded by the Constitution requires that a theory of
appropriate institutional or procedural rights be constructed from
textual, historical, or other materials.
The choice between the constructive and presumptive methods
will also be influenced by the need to prevent abuses of the judicial
power to protect unenumerated rights. To appreciate this we must
consider the limits of the Ninth Amendment.
C. The Limits of the Ninth Amendment
Some may fear that openly protecting unenumerated rights will
lead to abuses by the judiciary. Without minimizing the danger, I
suggest that the worst way to address the problem ofjudicial abuse
is to deny that courts may protect unenumerated rights. This would
124 See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
125 See supra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
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amount to a preemptive surrender of these rights to the far greater
threat of legislative or executive abuse. Instead, the problem ofju-
dicial abuse is best addressed at the level of general constitutional
theory by strongly insisting on two formal constraints on judicial
power and by using the structural constraints that are available to
control judicial abuse. These traditionally recognized constraints
concern the proper scope of all constitutional rights-whether enu-
merated or unenumerated.
1. Formal Constraints and the Choice of Interpretive Method
There are two formal constraints that concern the proper scope
of both enumerated and unenumerated constitutional rights.
Although I realize that these constraints are controversial, I shall
not attempt a full elaboration or defense of them here. I shall indi-
cate, however, how these formal constraints are bolstered in prac-
tice by the choice between the constructive and presumptive
methods of interpreting unenumerated rights.
First, substantive constitutional rights are, in the current vernac-
ular, negative, not positive.1 26 They do not generate affirmative
claims against the government but legally protect rightful domains
of discretionary conduct with which government may not interfere.
These rights specify areas within which government ought not to
act. As was suggested above,1 27 these kinds of constitutional rights
reinforce and extend constitutional limits on governmental power.
In contrast, procedural constitutional rights are both negative and
positive, but they limit the manner by which government, not pri-
vate citizens, may exercise its proper powers.1 28 These rights spec-
ify areas within which government ought to act only in a particular
mode.
Second, judges may exercise neither executive nor legislative
powers-such as the power to tax or to appropriate funds-to en-
force either enumerated or unenumerated rights. In Jefferson's
words, judges must be "kept strictly to their own department."1 29
This means that, by and large, judges only have the power to strike
down legislation or executive actions. Judges may only say "no"-
and judicial negation is not legislation. 130
The formal distinction between procedural and substantive
126 See Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 864 (1986).
A more illuminating and neutral terminology would distinguish between liberty and wel-
fare rights. See L. LOMASKY, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND THE MORAL COMMUNITY 84 (1987).
127 See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
128 This is the much-belittled "public-private" distinction. See Barnett, Foreword:
Four Senses of the "Public-Pivate" Distinction, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 267 (1986).
129 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 69.
130 I thank Leonard Liggio for suggesting to me this felicitous phrase.
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constitutional rights is easier to maintain in practice if both methods
are used to determine the unenumerated institutional or procedural
rights that government must respect when exercising its powers,
while only the presumptive method is used to protect the
unenumerated background rights retained by the people from gov-
ernment infringement. By emphasizing the fact that judges are pro-
tecting immunities from governmental interference with rightful
conduct, confining the enforcement of substantive rights to the pre-
sumptive method helps confine judges to exercising judicial
negation.
To see how these constraints combine to effectively limit the
scope of unenumerated rights, consider the tentative suggestion of
Charles Black that the Ninth Amendment may authorize judges to
protect the "effective 'pursuit of happiness' "13 1-for example, to
combat "physical and intellectual malnutrition in childhood."' 132 In-
terpreted as a right of children against their parents, this claim does
not require the Ninth Amendment for its foundation; it can be read-
ily assimilated into the common law of guardianship. Intepreted as
a constitutional right against the government, such a claim runs
afoul of the constraints just discussed. Such purported rights are
substantive, not procedural, but they are positive in nature; they re-
quire the appropriation and expenditure of tax revenues; they can-
not be implemented by judicial negation. Further, such a claim
cannot plausibly be cast as either a presumptive immunity from gov-
ernmental interference with rightful conduct or as a restriction on
the means by which government pursues a permissible end.
These formal limits on the use of the Ninth Amendment, bol-
stered by the appropriate use of the constructive and presumptive
methods of interpretation, confine the judiciary to enforcing only
those unenumerated rights that are comparable to the substantive
and procedural rights that were enumerated. However, when legis-
latures decide to dispense benefits or provide government "serv-
ices" through administrative agencies, assuming such schemes are
otherwise permitted under the constitution's enumerated powers,
judges are not creating entitlements de novo when they insist that
such schemes be administered in a manner consistent with such con-
stitutional principles as due process of law and equal protection.
Respect for such procedural constraints is the price of using public,
as opposed to private, institutions to achieve social goals.
When necessary, the Ninth Amendment stands ready to supple-
ment these and other expressed procedural rights. A good example
of the importance of unenumerated procedural rights is provided by
131 Black, supra note 78, at 194.
132 Id.
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Boling v. Sharpe 13 3 in which the Court held that a person has a right
to the equal protection of the laws against the federal as well as state
governments, notwithstanding the fact that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the states. 134
Another example is Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia 135 in which
the Ninth Amendment was used by a plurality of the Court to justify
the protection of the right to attend and report on criminal trials. 136
2. Structural Constraints
We are not limited to formal constraints to control judicial
abuse. Constitutional amendment, judicial nomination by an
elected president and confirmation by an elected Senate, and im-
peachment by an elected House (followed by a trial in the Senate)
are some of the structural constraints on the judiciary. The rarity
with which these and other structural constraints are used to alter
judicial decisions does not necessarily mean that these constraints
are ineffective. It could well mean that, for better or worse, judicial
decisions have largely reflected the sentiments of the majority.
One structural limitation on the Ninth Amendment may now be
considered archaic for most purposes. Like the rest of the Bill of
Rights, the Ninth Amendment was most likely intended to apply
only to the national government.' 37 This did not mean that the peo-
ple retained no comparable rights against state governments. It
meant only that the federal government, including the federal judi-
ciary, lacked jurisdiction in the original scheme to protect at least
some of the rights retained by the people from infringements by the
states. 138 With the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, how-
ever, this limitation on the protection of the rights of the people was
substantially altered. 139
If the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is viewed as establishing the same constitutional pre-
sumption in favor of individual and associational liberty against the
states as the Ninth Amendment established against the federal gov-
ernment, then whether the unenumerated rights retained by the
people are seen as protected by one provision or the other may be
133 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
134 See id. at 499-500.
135 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
136 Id. at 579 n.15.
137 This view is not, however, without its dissent. Some, like Bennett Patterson,
think the Ninth Amendment has always been directly applicable to the states. See B.
PATTERSON, supra note 5, at 36-43.
138 Even the original scheme extended constitutional protection to some rights re-
tained by the people against state governments as, for example, with the Contracts
Clause.
139 See M. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE (1986).
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immaterial.140 Nonetheless, the reconception of the Ninth Amend-
ment urged here would undermine the argument that the Four-
teenth Amendment should be limited to a very selective
incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Given that the Fourteenth
Amendment extends the protection of constitutional rights to acts
of state governments, the Ninth Amendment stands ready to re-
spond to a crabbed construction that limits the scope of this protec-
tion to the enumerated rights (and even then to only certain of
those rights).
Few would advocate preventing abuse of such expressed, but
abstract constitutional provisions as the Equal Protection Clause or
the Due Process Clauses by ignoring them. Rather, we prevent judi-
cial abuse of open-ended provisions by formal and structural con-
straints. The proper way to control abuse of the Ninth Amendment
is no different. If constrained in these ways, the judicial protection
of unenumerated rights need not constitute the exercise of illegiti-
mate "legislative" power.
CONCLUSION: RECONCEIVING THE NINTH AMENDMENT
The Ninth Amendment may be forgotten, but it is not gone.
We can be grateful to James Madison for conceiving the Ninth
Amendment. Without it any claim that the people retain rights
other than those specified in the Constitution would be dismissed
today as the product of a fevered imagination. As it is, the Ninth
Amendment has been all but imaginary in constitutional adjudica-
tion because the Supreme Court and most constitutional analysts
have seriously misconceived it. Although the task of interpreting
the Ninth Amendment and protecting unenumerated rights can
never be complete, it must be commenced in earnest if balance is to
be restored to our constitutional scheme. The time has come to
reconceive the Ninth Amendment.
140 Sanford Levinson has suggested that the renewed interest in the Ninth Amend-
ment has been spurred, in part, by the absence of Supreme Court precedent definitively
inhibiting its use. In contrast, judicial scrutiny on the basis of the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment must confront the Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). See Levinson, Constitutional Rhetoric and the Ninth Amendment, 64
CHi.-KENr L. REV. 131, 143-48 (1988).
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